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A sufficiently rapidly rising carbon tax may increase near-term emissions compared with the 
case of no carbon tax. Even so, such a carbon tax path may reduce total costs related to 
climate change, since the tax may reduce total carbon extraction. A government cannot 
commit to a specific carbon tax rate in the distant future. For reasonable assumptions about 
expectation formation, a higher present carbon tax will reduce near-term carbon emissions. 
Moreover, whatever the expectations about future tax rates are, near-term emissions will 
decline for a sufficiently high carbon tax. However, if the near-term tax rate for some reason 
is set below its optimal level, increased concern for the climate may change taxes in a manner 
that increases near-term emissions. 
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During the last couple of years, there has been a considerable literature dis-
cussing the so-called "green paradox". This term stems from Sinn (2008a,b),
who argues that some designs of climate policy, intended to mitigate car-
bon emissions, might actually increase carbon emissions, at least in the short
run. The reason for this possibility is that fossil fuels are nonrenewable scarce
resources. For such resources, Sinclair (1992) pointed out that "the key de-
cision of those lucky enough to own oil-wells is not so much how much to
produce as when to extract it." Sinn￿ s point is that if e.g. a carbon tax rises
su¢ ciently rapidly, pro￿t maximizing resource owners will bring forward the
extraction of their resources. Hence, in the absence of carbon capture and
storage (CCS), carbon emissions increase.1
A rapidly increasing carbon tax is not the only possible cause of a green
paradox. A declining price of a substitute, either because of increasing subsi-
dies or technological improvement, can give the same e⁄ect: see e.g. Strand
(2007) , Gerlagh (2010) and van der Ploeg and Withagen (2010). In a set-
ting of heterogeneous countries and rising fuel prices, Hoel (2008) showed
that carbon emissions may increase also as a consequence of an immediate
and once and for all downward shift in the cost of producing a substitute.
As mentioned above, Sinclair (1992) pointed out that the time pro￿le of
the carbon tax was important for the development of emissions. A thorough
analysis of the e⁄ects of taxation on resource extraction was given by Long
and Sinn (1985) , but without explicitly discussing climate e⁄ects. The opti-
mal design of the carbon tax path in the presence of carbon resource scarcity
has since been analyzed by among others Ulph and Ulph (1994), Withagen
(1994) , Hoel and Kverndokk (1996) , Tahvonen (1997) , Chakravorty et al.
(2006). One of the insights from the literature is that the principles for
setting an optimal carbon tax (or price of carbon quotas) are the same as
when the limited availability of carbon resources is ignored: At any time,
the optimal price of carbon emissions should be equal to the present value of
1Throuout this paper, CCS is ignored. Discussions of climate policy when there is a
possibility of CCS and when the carbon resource scarcity is taken into considereation have
been given by Amigues et al. (2010), Le Kama et al. (2010) and Hoel and Jensen (2010).
2all future climate costs caused by present emissions. A second insight from
the literature is that when actual policies deviate from what is optimal, one
might get di⁄erent results than one would ￿nd if carbon resource scarcity
were ignored.
The present paper focuses on the e⁄ects of carbon taxes that are not
designed optimally. This includes the case of a carbon tax that is currently
set at its optimal level, but without the regulator committing to the future
tax development.
Section 2 shows how the carbon extraction path depends on the time
path of the carbon tax. In particular, for a rapidly increasing carbon tax,
near-term emissions may be higher the higher is the level of the carbon tax.
However, if the level is high enough, near-term extraction is lower with a tax
than without, no matter how rapidly the tax increases.
The results of section 2 are generalized to the case of endogenously de-
termined total extraction in section 3. For this case, near-term emissions
may decline even if the tax rate rises by a rate higher than the interest rate.
Moreover, total extraction is lower the higher is the level of the carbon tax
path. An implication of this is that climate change costs may be lower with
a tax than without, even if near-term extraction is higher with the tax than
without.
Policy makers can in reality not commit to tax rates in the distant future.
In the absence of commitment, resource owners must base extraction deci-
sions on their expectations about future tax rates, which may in turn depend
on the current carbon tax rate. Section 4 demonstrates that for reasonable
assumptions about expectation formation, a higher present carbon tax will
reduce near-term carbon emissions.
In section 5 it is shown that introducing a su¢ ciently high present carbon
tax will make near-term emissions decline, no matter what the cost structure
of extraction is and no matter what expectations about the future carbon
tax rate are. The possibility of a green paradox is thus not an argument
against using a carbon tax as the main climate policy instrument. If any-
thing, the possibility of a green paradox suggests that the level of the carbon
tax should be set relatively high immediately, and not currently low and
3gradually increasing.
Section 6 ￿nally considers the case in which carbon taxes are set endoge-
nously, depending on the preferences related to climate change. I show that
increased concern for the climate issue might increase near-term emissions.
However, this can only occur if there is some obstacle that prevents the
near-term tax rates being as high as their optimal levels.
Section 7 gives a brief summary of the main results.
2 The green paradox when total carbon ex-
traction is given
Consider the simplest possible model of resource extraction: The available
amount of the carbon resource is given by ￿ A, and unit extraction costs are
constant equal to c. The consumer price of the resource is q(t), and in the
absence of taxes this is also the producer price. Producers are price takers






￿rt [q(t) ￿ c]x(t)dt (1)
s.t.
_ A(t) = x(t)
A(0) = 0
x(t) ￿ 0 for all t
A(t) ￿ ￿ A for all t
In an equilibrium the chosen extraction path must at all dates satisfy
x(t) = D(q(t)), where D is the demand function, assumed stationary for
simplicity. Moreover, provided D(c) > 0, total extraction must be equal to
4the available amount of the resource:
Z 1
0
x(t)dt = ￿ A (2)
It is well known that the equilibrium of this simple Hotelling model is
characterized by
_ q(t) = r(q(t) ￿ c) (3)
with q(0) determined so the resource constraint (2) is satis￿ed.
Consider a carbon tax w(t), i.e., a tax equal to w(t) per unit of x. It is




D(c + w(t))dt ￿ ￿ A (4)
For a carbon tax satisfying (4), the resource constraint is not a binding
constraint; the competitive supply of the carbon resource is like the supply
of any non-resource good, and the resource rent is therefore zero. For this
case there is clearly no green paradox, as the resource extraction at any time
is simply equal to demand D(c + w(t)), and thus independent of the future
carbon tax rate.
It might seem unrealistic to even consider a carbon tax path that is so high
that it drives all carbon resource rents to zero. However, in a richer model
with heterogeneous resources di⁄ering in extraction costs, a carbon tax of
the magnitude needed to reach moderately ambitious climate goals may very
well drive the resource rent to zero for the resources with the highest costs.
This issue is treated in the next section.
Consider next a carbon tax path that does not satisfy (4). Let ￿ denote






The price to the producer is now p(t) = q(t) ￿ w(t), and instead of
maximizing ￿ producers now maximize ￿ ￿￿. Assume that the carbon tax
5rises at a constant rate g. From (5) it follows that








Consider ￿rst the case of g = r, i.e., the present value of the carbon
tax rate is constant. In this case the last of the three terms in (6) is zero.
The second term is just like a lump-sum tax (since ￿ A is given), so that
the extraction pro￿le that maximizes ￿ also maximizes ￿ ￿ ￿. This result
generalizes to all cost functions, as long as the total amount extracted is
una⁄ected by the carbon tax.
Consider next the case of g > r, implying that the term in square brackets
is increasing over time. To maximize ￿ ￿ ￿, resource owners will therefore
extract more earlier and less later compared to the case of no taxation. This
is the green paradox: We get more extraction and hence also more emissions
in the present and the near future than without a carbon tax. Moreover,
this e⁄ect is stronger the higher is w(0), so that for a given value of g(> r),
present and near-term emissions increase as the current carbon tax increases.
Finally, consider the case of g < r. Theoretical and numerical models
that derive optimal climate policy typically ￿nd that it is optimal for the
carbon tax to rise at a rate lower than the rate of interest, provided high
carbon concentrations in the atmosphere are considered bad also when the
carbon concentration is below some exogenously given upper limit.2 For this
case the result is exactly the opposite of the case g > r; extraction and hence
also emissions are lower in the present and the near future than without a
carbon tax. Moreover, this e⁄ect is stronger the higher is w(0), so that for a
given value of g(< r), present and near-term emissions decline as the current
carbon tax increases.
2This result may be found in several contributions to the literature, as examples see
Hoel et al. (2009) or Hoel and Kverndokk (1996).
63 Total carbon extraction is endogenous
The model used so far has the unrealistic feature that the available carbon
resources are homogeneous and have the same extraction costs. A more in-
teresting case is when the unit cost of extraction is increasing in accumulated
extraction, denoted c(A) where A as before is accumulated extraction. This
is a speci￿cation frequently used in the resource literature, see e.g. Heal
(1976) and Hanson (1980). If there is an absolute limit on total carbon ex-
traction also in this case (i:e: A(t) ￿ ￿ A for all t), and this limit is binding
both with and without the carbon tax, there will be no signi￿cant changes
compared with the case of constant extraction costs. A more interesting case
is when the total amount extracted is determined endogenously. This is the
case analyzed below.
To simplify the discussion, it is assumed that demand is zero if the price
is su¢ ciently high. Formally, it is assumed that there is a choke price ￿ q such
that D(q) = 0 for q ￿ ￿ q, and D(q) > 0 and D0(q) < 0 for q < ￿ q. This is a
purely technical assumption. If it instead had been assumed that D(q) > 0
for all q but approached zero as q ! 1, it would nevertheless be true that
for some high price ￿ q (e.g. a million dollars per barrel of oil) demand would
be so small that it would be of no practical interest (e.g. 1 barrel of oil per
year).
The pro￿t of the resource owners is as before given by (1), except that c
must now be replaced by c(A). The ￿rst three of the four constraints given
earlier remain valid, but there is no longer a binding constraint of the type
A(t) ￿ ￿ A.3
The analysis of the present case is given in the Appendix. Without any
carbon tax, the equilibrium is as before characterized by x(t) = D(q(t)) and
by equations (2) and (3), except that c in (3) is replaced by c(A). Further-
more, total extraction ￿ A is in the present case not exogenous, but determined
by
3The case of such a binding constraint can, however, be approximated by assuming
that c(A) ! 1 as A ! ￿ A.
7c( ￿ A) = ￿ q (7)
All resources that have an extraction cost below the choke price ￿ q are thus
extracted, and with a positive resource rent.4
Introducing a carbon tax w(t), the producer price is changed to p(t) =
q(t) ￿ w(t). Equation (3) remains valid, but with q replaced by p, giving
_ q(t) = r(q(t) ￿ c(A(t)) + [ _ w(t) ￿ rw(t)] (8)
As before, all resources that have an extraction cost below the price buyers
are willing to pay to the resource owners, which is ￿ q￿w(t￿) , will be extracted.
Instead of (7) and (2) we therefore have
c(A






where w(t￿) will depend on the time t￿ at which A(t) reaches A￿.
From these equations it is clear that unless c0(A) = 1, the introduction
of a carbon tax will reduce total extraction. Some resources that would have
been extracted if there were no carbon tax will thus be left unextracted with
a positive carbon tax. Total emissions therefore decline as a response to a
carbon tax, no matter what time pro￿le the carbon tax has.
What about present and near-term extraction and emissions? Consider
￿rst the case in which the carbon tax rises at the rate r. From the previous
section we know that the whole extraction pro￿le was una⁄ected by the car-
bon tax when total resource extraction was exogenous (provided the carbon
tax was not so high that (4) held). When total resource extraction goes down
as a response to the carbon tax, emissions must obviously go down in some
time periods. Does it go down in the present and near term? In other words,
does the initial consumer price q(0) go up as a response to the carbon tax?
The answer is yes, and follows from (8) and (9): If q(0) had not increased
4For q to reach ￿ q we must have _ q > 0 for A < ￿ A, i.e. q > c(A) from (3).
8as a response to the carbon tax, it would not increase at later dates either
as long as _ w(t) ￿ rw(t) ￿ 0. But if this were the case, the consumer price
would not reach the choke level ￿ q when resource extraction stops (remember
that A￿ < ￿ A). This would violate the equilibrium conditions.
The argument above applies also to the case in which the carbon tax rises
at a rate below r. For _ w(t) ￿ rw(t); the introduction of a carbon tax will
therefore reduce present and near-term emissions as well as total emissions.
If _ w(t) ￿ rw(t) is positive and su¢ ciently large, it follows from (8) that
q may reach ￿ q as A reaches A￿ even if q(0) is lower with a carbon tax than
without. For a su¢ ciently rapidly rising carbon tax we may thus have a
green paradox in terms of present and near-term emissions. However, even
in this case the carbon tax may be desirable, since it reduces total emissions.
4 Governments cannot commit to future car-
bon tax rates
So far, the analysis has been based on an implicit assumption that market
participants have full knowledge about the future carbon tax. However, in
reality policy makers cannot commit to tax rates in the distant future. It
might be possible to make a political commitment for the development of the
carbon tax rate for period of up to 10-15 years, but resource owners would
like to know the carbon tax for a longer period in order to make optimal
decisions regarding their resource extraction. In the absence of commitment,
resource owners must base their decisions on their expectations about future
tax rates, which may in turn depend on the current carbon tax rate.
To illustrate the above issues, this section considers a two-period model
of resource extraction. Period 1 should be interpreted as the near future,
for which resource owners have reasonable con￿dence about the size of the
carbon tax. Period 2 is the remaining future. As argued above, 10-15 years
might be a crude estimate of the length of period 1.
The assumptions about the extraction cost are the same as in section 3.
Formally, let each unit of the resource be indexed by a continuous variable z,
9and let c(z) be the cost of extracting unit z, with c0 ￿ 0. In the two-period
model x is extraction in period 1 and A￿x is extraction in period 2. The cost
of extracting x is thus given by G(x) =
R x







0 c(z)dz = G(A)￿G(x). Notice that these
relationships imply that G0(x) = c(x) and G0(A) = c(A). To simplify the
expressions in the subsequent analysis, it is assumed that extraction costs
are zero for z up to the value of x in all relevant equilibria so that G(x) = 05.
It is also assumed that G0(A) = c(A) > 0 and G00(A) = c0(A) > 0.
Producers of the carbon resource maximize
px + ￿ [P ￿ (A ￿ x) ￿ G(A)]
where p and P are the producer prices in period 1 and 2, respectively. This
gives the standard Hotelling equation
p = ￿P
and the equation determining total resource extraction (using G0(A) = c(A))
c(A) = P
The relationship between prices and extraction rates is given by the fol-
lowing equations, where w is the carbon tax in period 1 and W is the expected
carbon tax in period 2:
q ￿ p + w
Q ￿ P + W
x = f(q) (11)
A ￿ x = F(Q) (12)
where f(q) and F(Q) are demand functions for the two periods. The six
equations above give the following two equations in the two endogenous vari-
5This simplifying assumption is not important for the results.
10ables q and Q:
q ￿ ￿Q = w ￿ ￿W (13)
Q ￿ c(F(Q) + f(q)) = W (14)
It is straightforward to verify that these equations imply that an increase
in W (holding w constant) will give a reduction in q, i.e., an increase in x. A
more policy relevant question is how a change in w will a⁄ect q (and hence
x) when the expectation about W might depend on w. Let this expectation
be given by some function W = h(w). Inserting this into (13) and (14) and
















What are the conditions for a green paradox, in the sense that an increase
in the period 1 carbon tax gives an increase in period 1 emissions? This will
occur if and only if the derivative above is negative, i.e. if and only if
￿h
0 > 1 +
1
￿F 0c0
Consider ￿rst the case of c0 = "1", i.e., total resource extraction A is
exogenous. In this case a green paradox occurs if and only if ￿h0 > 1. If
this inequality holds, an increased tax in period 1 will give an expectation of
an increased tax in period 2 that in present value is at least as large as the
tax increase in period 1. This corresponds to the ￿nding in section 2 that
an increase in the current carbon tax will increase current extraction and
emissions if the tax rate is assumed to grow at a rate larger than the interest
rate.
For ￿nite values of c0, ￿h0 must be higher than some threshold that is
11larger than 1 in order to get a green paradox. This con￿rms the analysis
of section 3, where it was shown that an increase in the current carbon tax
would reduce current emissions even if if the tax rate was assumed to grow
at a rate slightly larger than the interest rate.
Can we say anything about the expectation function h(w)? One pos-
sibility would be that expectations are rational in the sense that market
participants believe that the government in period 2 will set the carbon tax
optimally based on the government￿ s preferences. Assume that climate costs
depend on the temperature increase ￿ in period 2 (from some base level).
Let the climate costs (as perceived by the government) be given by a damage
function ~ K(￿), which is assumed to be increasing and strictly convex. The
climate depends on emissions in both periods:
￿ = ~ ￿(x;A ￿ x) = ￿(x;A) (15)
The function ~ ￿ is assumed to be increasing in both its arguments. The
variable x in ~ ￿ is due partly to the lagged response of temperature to the
stock of carbon in the atmosphere, and partly due to the fact that emissions
in period 1 a⁄ect the stock of carbon in the atmosphere both in period 1
and 2. It is not obvious that the net a⁄ect x on ￿ for a given A is positive,
although this seems reasonable if one cares about how rapidly the climate
changes.6 Although ￿x has an ambiguous sign, ￿A is positive since ~ ￿ is
increasing in both arguments.
Inserting (15) into ~ K(￿) gives us
K(x;A) ￿ ~ K(￿(x;A))
which is increasing in A, while the sigh of Kx will be the same as the sign of
￿x. To make our derivations slightly simpler without changing anything of
substance, I assume that the function K(x;A) takes the simple form
K(x;A) ￿ E(A + ￿x) (16)
6Such a consideration cannot be captured in a 2-period model, but see the discussion
in Hoel (2008) in a continuous time model.
12where ￿ is a parameter that may be positive (Kx > 0) or negative (Kx < 0).
One case implying ￿ < 0 is the (somewhat implausible) case of the envi-
ronmental concern being limited to the maximal stock of carbon in the at-
mosphere, without any concern for how rapidly this maximal stock is reached.
In the current two-period model this corresponds to being concerned only
about the amount of carbon in the atmosphere in period 2. Some fraction ￿
of the carbon emitted in period 1 will be transferred to the ocean and other
carbon sinks at the end of period 1. Since some of the period 1 emissions do
not remain in the atmosphere in period 2, emissions in period 1 are in this
case therefore considered less harmful than emissions in period 2. Formally,
since only (1 ￿ ￿)x of the emissions in period 1 remain in the atmosphere in
period 2, and emissions in period 2 are A ￿ x, the climate costs in this case
are E((1 ￿ ￿)x + (A ￿ x)) = E(A ￿ ￿x); implying ￿ = ￿￿ in our notation.
The optimal carbon tax in period 2 is the Pigou tax
W = E
0(A + ￿x) = E
0(A ￿ x + (1 + ￿)x)
Inserting from (11) and (12) gives
W = E
0(F(Q) + (1 + ￿)f(q)) (17)
Inserting this equation into (13) and (14) and di⁄erentiating with respect
to w gives
 
1 + ￿(1 + ￿)E00f0 ￿￿ + ￿E00F 0
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A su¢ cient condition for H to be positive is that 1 + ￿￿c0f0 > 0. This
seems a reasonable assumption, as ￿ probably is considerably below 1 (1
unit more in future emissions is considerably worse for the climate than one
unit emissions moved from the future to the present). Moreover, if the time
span from present to future is long, the discount factor ￿ is low.
Assuming H > 0 it follows from (18) and (19) that an increase in the car-
bon tax in period 1 increases the consumer price in this period (and reduces
the consumer price in period 2). Use and extraction of the carbon resource
therefore decline in period 1, implying that there is no green paradox with
this assumption about how expectations of future taxes are created.











which in negative for H > 0: In other words, as the present carbon tax
increases, the expected future carbon tax declines. Obviously, with such
expectations no green paradox can occur.
5 No green paradox with a high carbon tax
For the case of constant unit costs of extraction, I showed in section 2 that if
the time path of the carbon tax was su¢ ciently high, carbon emissions would
for sure go down. More generally, a su¢ ciently high initial carbon tax will
make carbon emissions decline, no matter what the cost function is and no
matter what expectations about future carbon taxes are. This holds under
the mild assumption that resource owners will never sell their resource at a
price lower than their extraction costs. If the government introduces a carbon
tax that at the initial date is higher than the original resource rent (i.e. the
resource rent prior to the introduction of the tax) the consumer price must
increase in order for resource owners to cover their extraction costs. The
14demand for the resource, and therefore also carbon emissions, must therefore
decline.
How high must a carbon tax be for carbon emissions to decline? The
answer to this will di⁄er between coal and oil, which are the two most im-
portant sources of carbon from fossil fuels. Current coal prices are about
97 dollars per tonne7. CO2 emissions per tonne of coal are approximately 2
tonnes8, so that 97 dollars per tonne of coal corresponds to about 97/2 ￿
49 dollars per tonne of CO2:This coal price is split between extraction costs
and resource rent. The resource rent is probably much lower than 49 dollars
per tonne. In any case, a carbon tax above 49 dollars per tonne of CO2 will
for sure increase the consumer price of coal, and therefore also reduce CO2
emissions from the use of coal.
Turning next to oil, current oil prices are about 77 dollars per barrel.
CO2 emissions per barrel of oil are approximately 0:43 tonnes9, so that 77
dollars per barrel of oil corresponds to about 77/0.43 = 179 dollars per tonne
of CO2:This oil price is split between extraction costs and resource rent. The
resource rent is probably much lower than 179 dollars per tonne. In any case,
a carbon tax above 179 dollars per tonne of CO2 will for sure increase the
consumer price of oil, and therefore also reduce CO2 emissions from the use
of oil.
A carbon tax above about 179 dollars per tonne of CO2 will for sure
reduce carbon emissions. Since extraction costs for oil are not zero, the
threshold is in reality lower. With an extraction cost of oil of e.g. 30 dollars
per barrel, this threshold is reduced from 179 to 109 dollars per tonne of
CO2. Even this value is much higher than carbon tax rates or emission
quota prices in most countries. For instance, the quota price in EU is only
about 19 dollars per tonne of CO2. However, there are also cases of explicit
or implicit carbon taxes well above 109 dollars per tonne of CO2 in some
7Coal and oil prices are averages for the ￿rst half of 2010, obtained from
http://www.worldbank.org/prospects/pinksheets, "commodity price data".
8The exact amount of CO2 per tonne of coal depends on the type of coal. Dividing
total world CO2 emissions from coal consumption by total world coal consumption gives
a factor of 1.97 (numbers from http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/iea/coal.html for 2006).
9See e.g. http://www.epa.gov/greenpower/pubs/calcmeth.htm.
15countries (e.g. Sweden), at least for some sectors of the economy. Most
integrated assessment models suggest an optimal current price of emissions
clearly below 100 dollars per tonne of CO2 (see e.g. Hoel et al., 2009, for an
overview).
For carbon taxes below about 100 dollars per tonne of CO2 we cannot
rule out the possibility of emissions from the use of oil increasing (compared
to emissions without any tax). However, emissions from the use of coal
will for sure go down provided the carbon tax is above about 49 dollars per
tonne of CO2. Since extraction costs for coal are not zero, the threshold
is in reality lower. With an extraction cost of coal of e.g. 50 dollars per
tonne, this threshold is reduced from 49 to 24 dollars per tonne of CO2.
Optimal near-term carbon prices derived from integrated assessment models
are in many cases above 24 dollars per tonne of CO2, at least for the more
ambitious climate goals. Introducing a world wide carbon tax at a level above
24 dollars per tonne of CO2 is therefore likely to reduce emissions from the
use of coal. However, since we cannot rule out the possibility of oil extraction
increasing as a response to a global carbon tax in the range of about 20-100
dollars, we cannot rule out the possibility of near-term emissions increasing
as a consequence of introducing a carbon tax in this range.
6 A green paradox with endogenous carbon
taxes
So far the carbon tax rate, at least in period 1, has been considered ex-
ogenous. In reality, tax rates will be determined endogenously, with the
government￿ s preferences being an important factor. What are the e⁄ects in
this case of an increased concern for the climate? I analyze this below, and
show that a green paradox may occur if the tax in the ￿rst period is lower
than its ideal level.
Let the government￿ s preferences be represented by the function E(A +
￿x), as discussed in the previous section. Moreover, let let b(x) and B(A￿x)
be the consumer bene￿t of using the resource in the two periods, with q = b0
16and Q = B0. The ￿st best optimum is found by maximizing
b(x) + ￿ [B(A ￿ x) ￿ G(A) ￿ E(A + ￿x)]
and the ￿rst order conditions are (using q = b0, Q = B0 and c(A) = G0(A))
q ￿ ￿Q = ￿￿E
0(A + ￿x)
Q ￿ c(A) = E
0(A + ￿x)
Comparing with (13) and (14), it is clear that the ￿rst best optimum is
achieved if




These two equations show how the optimal carbon taxes in the two peri-
ods depend on the preferences of the government, represented by the function
E(A + ￿x). A slightly generalized version of these equations is




where the positive parameter ￿ ￿ 0 represents the possibility that the tax
rate in period 1 is set at a level below its optimal level. There could be
several reasons why ￿ < 1. One obvious possibility is that the present model
represents the global economy, and that E0 thus represents global marginal
climate costs. If these costs are not fully internalized in period 1 due to the
lack of an international climate agreement, taxes throughout the world would
typically be set below their optimal values.
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if and only if ￿(1 + ￿) > 1. If this inequality holds, it follows from
the previous analysis that there will be no green paradox: Carbon emissions
in period 1 are lower when taxes are given by (20) and (21) than they would
have been if there were no taxes. The opposite is true if ￿(1 + ￿) < 1, which
will occur if ￿ < 0 or ￿ su¢ ciently small. For the case of ￿ < 0 it is of course
not really a paradox that early emissions increase as a response to climate
policy, since ￿ < 0 means that early emissions are good for the climate given
the total amount of emissions. In the rest of this section I therefore assume
￿ > 0.
To see in more detail what the consequences are of a positive shift in
the marginal climate costs function E0, I insert (20) and (21) back into the
equilibrium conditions (13) and (14). Using the demand functions (11) and
(12) this gives
q ￿ ￿Q = ￿ [￿(1 + ￿) ￿ 1][E
0(F(Q) + (1 + ￿)f(q)) + s] (22)
Q ￿ c(F(Q) + f(q)) = E
0(F(Q) + (1 + ￿)f(q)) + s (23)
where s is a shift parameter.
Di⁄erentiating (22) and (23) with respect to s gives
 
1 ￿ ￿ [￿(1 + ￿) ￿ 1](1 + ￿)E00f0 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ [￿(1 + ￿) ￿ 1]E00F 0
























































is an increasing function of ￿. Even for ￿ = 0 it is reasonable to assume that
J > 0. A su¢ cient condition for this is that ￿F 0c0 ￿ ￿c0f0 ￿ ￿￿c0f0F 0E00 >
0, i.e. that ￿E00(￿F 0) < 1 + F0
￿f0, which is reasonable to assume: In the
climate cost function, it seems reasonable to assume that ￿ is relatively small,
certainly below 1. Moreover, E00(￿F 0) < 1 if E00 < (￿F 0)￿1, which says that
a decline in the consumer price of carbon by e.g. one dollar, giving an
increased use of carbon, increases marginal environmental damages by less
than one dollar.


















An positive shift in the function E0 thus for sure makes q larger and therefore
near-term emissions decline. However, it is not obvious that future emissions
decline: If ￿c0 is su¢ ciently large, Q will decline and future carbon emissions












[￿ (1 + ￿)f
0 + F
0] < 0
19The last result also valid for ￿ < 1. From A = f(q) + F(Q) and the














0] < 0 (26)
Although total emissions decline with increasing climate concern even if
￿ < 1, it is not obvious that near-term emissions decline. The term in square
brackets in (24) is positive for ￿ = 1, but is declining in ￿ and becomes
negative for su¢ ciently low positive values of ￿ . Formally,
@q
@s
< 0 for ￿ <
c0F 0
(1 + ￿)(1 + c0F 0)
(27)
Notice that the threshold value of ￿ for the green paradox case of
@q
@s < 0
to occur is higher the larger is c0, with the threshold being (1 + ￿)￿1 for the
limiting case of c0 ! 1.
Finally, consider the two limiting case of c0 = 0 and c0 = "1". The case
of c0 = 0 means that there is no scarcity of the resource, neither of a physical













Hence, in this case emissions unambiguously decline in both periods as a
response to increased concern for climate change.













(1 ￿ ￿(1 + ￿))
20where





00 (1 ￿ ￿(1 + ￿))
I assume ~ J > 0 for the same reason as J was assumed positive.
By assumption, total emissions are not a⁄ected by preferences in this
case. Formally, this follows from (26) and the fact that J ! 1 as c0 ! 1.





signs. If ￿ > (1 + ￿)
￿1,
@q
@s < 0 and
@Q
@s > 0, while the opposite is true if
￿ < (1 + ￿)
￿1. If there are no obstacles preventing the near-term tax rate
being equal to its optimal value, increased concern for the environment thus
gives a postponement of extraction and emissions in this case.
7 Concluding remarks
There are six important lessons from this paper:
1. Analyses of climate policy without taking into consideration the fact
that fossil fuels are scarce non-renewable resources can give mislead-
ing conclusions. Although the principles for the design of an optimal
carbon tax are not a⁄ected, the consequences of deviating from the op-
timum may be di⁄erent than one might believe if the scarcity of carbon
resources is ignored.
2. A rapidly rising carbon tax may give a green paradox in the sense that
near-term emissions become higher than they would be without any
carbon tax. The threshold of how rapidly the tax must increase is
higher when the resource is not limited in an absolute physical sense,
but more realistically by extraction costs increasing with accumulated
extraction.
3. If the resource is not limited in an absolute physical sense, but by
extraction costs increasing with accumulated extraction, total climate
change costs may go down even if the carbon tax path gives increased
near-term emissions.
214. In reality, governments do not set carbon tax paths extending into the
distant future. Instead, they set a carbon tax for a relatively short pe-
riod, and market participants form expectations about the carbon tax
in the more distant future. For reasonable modeling of these expecta-
tions, a higher current carbon tax will reduce near-term emissions.
5. If a su¢ ciently high carbon tax is introduced, emissions will for sure
decline. The possibility of a green paradox is therefore not an argument
against the use of a carbon tax, but rather an argument against setting
the carbon tax too low.
6. If the near-term tax rate for some reason is set below its optimal level,
increased concern for the climate may change taxes in a manner that
increases near-term emissions.
Appendix: Endogenous total extraction
The simplest way to analyze the market equilibrium is to consider this equi-
librium as the outcome of maximizing the sum of consumer bene￿ts of using
the resources and the costs, including taxes, of extracting the resource. Let
B(x) be the consumer bene￿t, with q = B0(x) and ￿ q = B0(0). I assume that
c(0)+w(0) < B0(0) and c(A) > B0(0) for su¢ ciently high values of A (where
w(0) is the initial carbon tax). Moreover, I restrict the analysis to the case of
a non-decreasing carbon tax path w(t), so that extraction will be declining.





￿rt [B(x(t)) ￿ c(A(t))x(t) ￿ w(t)x(t)]dt
This objective function is maximized subject to
22_ A(t) = x(t) (28)
x(t) ￿ 0
A(0) = 0
The current value Hamiltonian is (written so the shadow price of A, de-
noted ￿, is positive, and ignoring time references where this cannot cause
misunderstanding)
H = B(x) ￿ c(A)x ￿ wx ￿ ￿x
The optimum conditions are
B
0(x) ￿ c(A) ￿ w ￿ ￿ ￿ 0 [= 0 for x > 0] (29)








Using (28) and q = B0 it follows from (29) and (30) that the consumer
price development is given by
_ q = r(q ￿ c(A)) + [ _ w ￿ rw] (32)
which corresponds to equation (8) in the text.
It is useful to distinguish between the case of w constant (= ￿ w) and w
increasing. For w = ￿ w (which may be zero or positive) carbon extraction
is positive for all t. To see this assume the opposite, i.e. that x(t) = 0 for
t ￿ T. From (30) this implies that _ ￿ = r￿ for t ￿ T. From (31) it follows
that ￿(T) = 0, so that (29) implies
B
0(0) ￿ c(A(T)) ￿ ￿ w ￿ 0
23Going backwards in time from T, we see from the di⁄erential equations (28)
and (30) that ￿(t) = 0 and B0(0) ￿ c(A(t)) ￿ ￿ w ￿ 0 will hold also for all
t < T: But this violates the assumption c(0)+w(0) < B0(0). This completes
the proof that x(t) > 0 for all t when w(t) = ￿ w:
Although x(t) > 0 for all t when w(t) = ￿ w; x(t) will asymptotically
approach zero. To see this, assume instead that x(t) > ￿ > 0 for all t. Then
A(t) become so large that c(A) > B0(0), so that (29) would be violated for
any non-negative w + ￿.
As x(t) approaches 0 asymptotically, ￿(t) approaches 0, and from (29) it
follows that A(t) approaches ￿ A given by
c( ￿ A) + ￿ w = B
0(0) (33)
The case of w(t) increasing over time is not much di⁄erent from w con-
stant. However, if w is unbounded, extraction cannot be positive extraction
for all t, since eventually we would have B0(0)￿c(A)￿w(t) < 0 for any value
of A. In the present case there is thus a date t￿ at which extraction stops.
At this date we have ￿(t￿) = 0, as (31) otherwise would be violated. Since





Since the time path of extraction depends on the carbon tax also prior
to t￿, the values A￿and w(t￿) are determined endogenously by the condition
(34) in combination with the di⁄erential equations (28) and (32) as well as
q = B0(x).
References
Amigues, J.-P., G. La⁄orgue and M. Moreaux (2010). Optimal capture and
sequestration from the carbon emission ￿ ow and from the atmospheric car-
bon stock with heterogeneous energy consuming sectors. Paper presented
at the SURED conference 2010.
24Chakravorty, U., B. Magne and M. Moreaux (2006). A Hotelling model
with a ceiling on the stock of pollution. Journal of Economic Dynamics &
Control, 30(12), 2875￿ 2904.
Gerlagh, R. (2010). Too Much Oil. CESifo Economic Studies, forthcoming.
Hanson, D. A. (1980). Increasing Extraction Costs and Resource Prices:
Some Further Results. The Bell Journal of Economics, 11(1), 335￿ 342.
Heal, G. (1976). The Relationship between Price and Extraction Cost for
a Resource with a Backstop Technology. The Bell Journal of Economics,
7(2), 371￿ 378.
Hoel, M. (2008). Bush Meets Hotelling: E⁄ects of Improved Renewable
Energy Technology on Greenhouse Gas Emissions. CESifo Working Paper
2492.
Hoel, M., M. Greaker, C. Grorud and I. Rasmussen (2009). Climate policy -
costs and design. TemaNord 2009:550, Nordic Council of Ministers.
Hoel, M. and S. Jensen (2010). Cutting Costs of Catching Carbon: Intertem-
poral e⁄ects under di⁄erent climate policies. Unbuplished work in progress,
Department of Economics, University of Oslo and Ragnar Frisch Centre
for Economic Research.
Hoel, M. and S. Kverndokk (1996). Depletion of fossil fuels and the impacts
of global warming. Resource and Energy Economics, 18(2), 115￿ 136.
Le Kama, A., M. Fodha and G. La⁄orgue (2010). Optimal carbon capture
and storage policies. Paper presented at the SURED conference 2010.
Long, N. and H.-W. Sinn (1985). Surprise Price Shifts, Tax Changes and
the Supply Behavior of Resource Extracting Firms. Australian Economic
Papers, 24(45), 278￿ 289.
Sinclair, P. (1992). High does nothing and rising and worse: carbon taxes
should be kept declining to cut harmful emissions. Manchester School of
Economic and Social Studies, 60, 41￿ 52.
25Sinn, H. (2008a). Das Gr￿ne Paradoxon. Pl￿doyer f￿r eine Illusionsfreie
Klimapolitik. Econ.
Sinn, H. (2008b). Public Policies against Global Warming: a supply side
approach. International Tax and Public Finance, 15, 360￿ 394.
Strand, J. (2007). Technology Treaties and Fossil Fuels Extraction. The
Energy Journal, 28 (4), 129￿ 142.
Tahvonen, O. (1997). Fossil Fuels, Stock Externalities, and Backstop Tech-
nology. Canadian Journal of Economics, 30, 855￿ 874.
Ulph, A. and D. Ulph (1994). The optimal time path of a carbon tax. Oxford
Economic Papers, 46, 857￿ 868.
van der Ploeg, F. and C. A. Withagen (2010). Is There Really a Green
Paradox? CESifo Working Paper 2963.
Withagen, C. (1994). Pollution and exhaustibility of fossil fuels. Resource
and Energy Economics, 16, 235￿ 242.
26CESifo Working Paper Series 
for full list see Twww.cesifo-group.org/wpT 
(address: Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich, Germany, office@cesifo.de) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
3103 Andrea F. Presbitero and Alberto Zazzaro, Competition and Relationship Lending: 
Friends or Foes?, June 2010 
 
3104 Dan Anderberg and Yu Zhu, The Effect of Education on Martial Status and Partner 
Characteristics: Evidence from the UK, June 2010 
 
3105 Hendrik Jürges, Eberhard Kruk and Steffen Reinhold, The Effect of Compulsory 
Schooling on Health – Evidence from Biomarkers, June 2010 
 
3106 Alessandro Gambini and Alberto Zazzaro, Long-Lasting Bank Relationships and 
Growth of Firms, June 2010 
 
3107 Jenny E. Ligthart and Gerard C. van der Meijden, Coordinated Tax-Tariff Reforms, 
Informality, and Welfare Distribution, June 2010 
 
3108 Vilen Lipatov and Alfons Weichenrieder, Optimal Income Taxation with Tax 
Competition, June 2010 
 
3109 Malte Mosel, Competition, Imitation, and R&D Productivity in a Growth Model with 
Sector-Specific Patent Protection, June 2010 
 
3110 Balázs Égert, Catching-up and Inflation in Europe: Balassa-Samuelson, Engel’s Law 
and other Culprits, June 2010 
 
3111 Johannes Metzler and Ludger Woessmann, The Impact of Teacher Subject Knowledge 
on Student Achievement: Evidence from Within-Teacher Within-Student Variation, 
June 2010 
 
3112 Leif Danziger, Uniform and Nonuniform Staggering of Wage Contracts, July 2010 
 
3113 Wolfgang Buchholz and Wolfgang Peters, Equity as a Prerequisite for Stable 
Cooperation in a Public-Good Economy – The Core Revisited, July 2010 
 
3114 Panu Poutvaara and Olli Ropponen, School Shootings and Student Performance, July 
2010 
 
3115 John Beirne, Guglielmo Maria Caporale and Nicola Spagnolo, Liquidity Risk, Credit 
Risk and the Overnight Interest Rate Spread: A Stochastic Volatility Modelling 
Approach, July 2010 
 
3116 M. Hashem Pesaran, Predictability of Asset Returns and the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis, July 2010 
 
3117 Dorothee Crayen, Christa Hainz and Christiane Ströh de Martínez, Remittances, 
Banking Status and the Usage of Insurance Schemes, July 2010  
3118 Eric O’N. Fisher, Heckscher-Ohlin Theory when Countries have Different 
Technologies, July 2010 
 
3119 Huw Dixon and Hervé Le Bihan, Generalized Taylor and Generalized Calvo Price and 
Wage-Setting: Micro Evidence with Macro Implications, July 2010 
 
3120 Laszlo Goerke and Markus Pannenberg, ‘Take it or Go to Court’ – The Impact of Sec. 
1a of the German Protection against Dismissal Act on Severance Payments -, July 2010 
 
3121 Robert S. Chirinko and Daniel J. Wilson, Can Lower Tax Rates be Bought? Business 
Rent-Seeking and Tax Competition among U.S. States, July 2010 
 
3122 Douglas Gollin and Christian Zimmermann, Global Climate Change and the 
Resurgence of Tropical Disease: An Economic Approach, July 2010 
 
3123 Francesco Daveri and Maria Laura Parisi, Experience, Innovation and Productivity – 
Empirical Evidence from Italy’s Slowdown, July 2010 
 
3124 Carlo V. Fiorio and Massimo Florio, A Fair Price for Energy? Ownership versus Market 
Opening in the EU15, July 2010 
 
3125 Frederick van der Ploeg, Natural Resources: Curse or Blessing?, July 2010 
 
3126 Kaisa Kotakorpi and Panu Poutvaara, Pay for Politicians and Candidate Selection: An 
Empirical Analysis, July 2010 
 
3127 Jun-ichi Itaya, Makoto Okamura and Chikara Yamaguchi, Partial Tax Coordination in a 
Repeated Game Setting, July 2010 
 
3128 Volker Meier and Helmut Rainer, On the Optimality of Joint Taxation for Non-
Cooperative Couples, July 2010 
 
3129 Ryan Oprea, Keith Henwood and Daniel Friedman, Separating the Hawks from the 
Doves: Evidence from Continuous Time Laboratory Games, July 2010 
 
3130 Mari Rege and Ingeborg F. Solli, The Impact of Paternity Leave on Long-term Father 
Involvement, July 2010 
 
3131 Olaf Posch, Risk Premia in General Equilibrium, July 2010 
 
3132 John Komlos and Marek Brabec, The Trend of BMI Values by Centiles of US Adults, 
Birth Cohorts 1882-1986, July 2010 
 
3133 Emin Karagözoğlu and Arno Riedl, Information, Uncertainty, and Subjective 
Entitlements in Bargaining, July 2010 
 
3134 John Boyd, Gianni De Nicolò and Elena Loukoianova, Banking Crises and Crisis 
Dating: Theory and Evidence, July 2010 
 
  
3135 Michael R. Baye, Dan Kovenock and Casper G. de Vries, The Herodotus Paradox, July 
2010 
 
3136 Martin Kolmar and Hendrik Rommeswinkel, Group Contests with Complementarities in 
Efforts, July 2010 
 
3137 Carolina Manzano and Xavier Vives, Public and Private Learning from Prices, Strategic 
Substitutability and Complementarity, and Equilibrium Multiplicity, July 2010 
 
3138 Axel Löffler, Gunther Schnabl and Franziska Schobert, Inflation Targeting by Debtor 
Central Banks in Emerging Market Economies, July 2010 
 
3139 Yu-Fu Chen and Michael Funke, Global Warming and Extreme Events: Rethinking the 
Timing and Intensity of Environmental Policy, July 2010 
 
3140 Lawrence M. Kahn, Labor Market Policy: A Comparative View on the Costs and 
Benefits of Labor Market Flexibility, July 2010 
 
3141 Ben J. Heijdra, Jochen O. Mierau and Laurie S.M. Reijnders, The Tragedy of 
Annuitization, July 2010 
 
3142 Erkki Koskela, Outsourcing Cost and Tax Progression under Nash Wage Bargaining 
with Flexible Outsourcing, July 2010 
 
3143 Daniel Osberghaus and Christiane Reif, Total Costs and Budgetary Effects of 
Adaptation to Climate Change: An Assessment for the European Union, August 2010 
 
3144 Philip E. Graves, Benefit-Cost Analysis of Environmental Projects: A Plethora of 
Systematic Biases, August 2010 
 
3145 Sabrina Di Addario and Daniela Vuri, Entrepreneurship and Market Size. The Case of 
Young College Graduates in Italy, August 2010 
 
3146 Shoshana Amyra Grossbard and Alfredo Marvăo Pereira, Will Women Save more than 
Men? A Theoretical Model of Savings and Marriage, August 2010 
 
3147 Jarko Fidrmuc, Time-Varying Exchange Rate Basket in China from 2005 to 2009, 
August 2010 
 
3148 Ilja Neustadt and Peter Zweifel, Is the Welfare State Sustainable? Experimental 
Evidence on Citizens’ Preferences for Redistribution, August 2010 
 
3149 Marcus Dittrich and Andreas Knabe, Wage and Employment Effects of Non-Binding 
Minimum Wages, August 2010 
 
3150 Shutao Cao, Enchuan Shao and Pedro Silos, Fixed-Term and Permanent Employment 
Contracts: Theory and Evidence, August 2010 
 
3151 Ludger Woessmann, Cross-Country Evidence on Teacher Performance Pay, August 
2010  
3152 Lorenzo C. G. Pozzi, Casper G. de Vries and Jorn Zenhorst, World Equity Premium 
Based Risk Aversion Estimates, August 2010 
 
3153 Volker Grossmann, Thomas M. Steger and Timo Trimborn, Dynamically Optimal R&D 
Subsidization, August 2010 
 
3154 Alexander Haupt, Tim Krieger and Thomas Lange, A Note on Brain Gain and Brain 
Drain: Permanent Migration and Education Policy, August 2010 
 
3155 António Afonso and Christophe Rault, Long-run Determinants of Sovereign Yields, 
August 2010 
 
3156 Franziska Tausch, Jan Potters and Arno Riedl, Preferences for Redistribution and 
Pensions. What can we Learn from Experiments?, August 2010 
 
3157 Martin Kolmar and Andreas Wagener, Inefficient Group Organization as Optimal 
Adaption to Dominant Environments, August 2010 
 
3158 Kai Carstensen, Klaus Wohlrabe and Christina Ziegler, Predictive Ability of Business 
Cycle Indicators under Test: A Case Study for the Euro Area Industrial Production, 
August 2010 
 
3159 Horst Rottmann and Timo Wollmershäuser, A Micro Data Approach to the 
Identification of Credit Crunches, August 2010 
 
3160 Philip E. Graves, Appropriate Fiscal Policy over the Business Cycle: Proper Stimulus 
Policies Can Work, August 2010 
 
3161 Michael Binder and Marcel Bluhm, On the Conditional Effects of IMF Program 
Participation on Output Growth, August 2010 
 
3162 Michael Binder, Qianying Chen, and Xuan Zhang, On the Effects of Monetary Policy 
Shocks on Exchange Rates, August 2010 
 
3163 Felix J. Bierbrauer, On the Optimality of Optimal Income Taxation, August 2010 
 
3164 Nikolaus Wolf, Europe’s Great Depression – Coordination Failure after the First World 
War, September 2010 
 
3165 Dan Kovenock and Brian Roberson, Conflicts with Multiple Battlefields, September 
2010 
 
3166 Jean-Pierre Ponssard and Catherine Thomas, Capacity Investment under Demand 
Uncertainty. An Empirical Study of the US Cement Industry, 1994-2006, September 
2010 
 
3167 Jørgen Juel Andersen, Jon H. Fiva and Gisle James Natvik, Voting when the Stakes are 
High, September 2010 
 
3168 Michael Hoel, Is there a Green Paradox?, September 2010 